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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on classical and contemporary sources in the philosophy of science and 
education, I argue that a robust understanding of fallibilism is absent from current 
education policy decisions. An inadequate appreciation of the uncertainty involved in the 
scientific method detracts from the education process, particularly affecting students 
who are subject to a hodgepodge of insufficiently supported "best practices."  
After explaining how this problem affects current education policy decisions, I 
explore the sources and nature of fallibilism. I describe different characterizations of the 
theory, emphasizing scientific fallibilism, and discuss its roots in the conjunction of 
finite human capabilities and complex, indeterminate, and dynamic systems.  
I suggest that a solution to the problem fallibilism poses for the practice of 
education should derive from the unique nature of the educational task, and I survey a 
number of influential theories of education in order to distill common elements. I argue 
that these essential and enduring aspects of education should be preserved in revisions to 
education policy, and suggest a set of principles to guide future decision making about 
the implementation of new research.  
While I argue that philosophical analysis is suited to the task of guiding 
education policy and serves as a useful lens through which to evaluate evidence-based 
policy proposals, I recognize that the solution offered is itself subject to the constraints 
of fallibilism. The resulting process functions more as a system of checks and balances 
than a concise algorithm for decision-making.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: SOME PROBLEMS WITH RESEARCH-BASED 
EDUCATION POLICY 
 
In the Preface to his New Organon, Bacon chides those at both extremes of the 
epistemic debate about how knowable the world is. At one extreme, with destructive 
results for truth and inquiry, some claim that we have established all significant laws of 
nature. “Those who have taken it on themselves to lay down the law of nature as 
something that has already been discovered and understood,” he writes, “have done great 
harm to philosophy and the sciences. As well as succeeding in producing [false] beliefs 
in people, they have been effective in squashing and stopping inquiry” (1999, p. 1). At 
the other extreme, some people have advocated complete skepticism on various pretexts, 
asserting “that absolutely nothing can be known—having reached this opinion through 
dislike of the ancient sophists, or through uncertainty and fluctuation of mind, or even 
through being crammed with some doctrine or other.” Bacon supports instead a more 
moderate path - that followed by some of the earlier ancient Greeks. 
Bacon explains how the pre-Socratics walked a careful line between 
skepticism and dogmatism. They neither presumed “to pronounce on everything” nor 
despaired of “coming to understand anything” (Bacon, 1999, p. 1). They recognized the 
road to understanding was not an easy one; often “they complained bitterly about how 
hard investigation is and how dark everything is, and were like impatient horses 
champing at the bit.” They did not forsake the objective of useful and true knowledge, 
 2 
 
however. Bacon likewise promotes a method of inquiry that painstakingly seeks to 
establish progressive “degrees of certainty.” 
Education policy decision-making in the United States today bears undesirable 
resemblance to the attitude of overconfidence critiqued by Bacon. I focus on American 
policy, though the problem may be evident elsewhere, given the progressively 
technocratic, or expertise-driven, nature of policy decisions in the United States, 
especially over the course of the past decade. Mr. Obama has been dubbed the “big data 
President”; federal decisions are increasingly justified with reference to statistics and 
recent research (Scola, 2013). Policy makers regularly ignore the fact that scientific 
findings are subject to the constraints of fallibilism, as are the rest of our individual and 
collective bodies of knowledge. Witness the federal implementation of “theories of best 
practice” with no other justification than that they represent the latest research. Consider 
the language used in Britain’s 1997 High Reliability Schools Project for evidence of this 
modern phenomenon:  
The High Reliability Schools Project is an attempt to move beyond the goal or 
relatively successful schools towards the creation of schools which are absolutely 
successful and which have eradicated failure. Using the latest information from 
the study of highly reliable organisations such as air traffic controllers and 
nuclear power plants (Hamilton, 2002, p. 147-148). 
 
Highly respected science is heralded as the solution to all our educational woes. Or 
consider the evolution of the standards movement over the past few decades:  
Back in the late 1980s, establishing curriculum standards sounded like a good 
idea. Wouldn’t it be great if each subject taught in school (language arts, science, 
mathematics, history, the arts) had its own clear-cut descriptions of what to teach 
and how to teach it? These recommendations could be based on a meta-analysis 
of the latest research in the subject, consultations with top experts and theorists, 
and systematic reviews of pedagogy and practice. Sometimes the states began by 
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accepting the premises of the national curriculum standards; others started fresh. 
Almost all subscribed to the more-is-better school of rulemaking, generating 
hundreds of standards, targets, benchmarks, goals, and procedures. The resulting 
mandates undermined classroom practitioners’ autonomy and professionalism in 
a variety of ways. Teachers were increasingly told by their states what to teach, 
when to teach it, and how often in pre-scripted, word-for-word, “teacher-proof” 
programs that not only ruled out teachers’ creativity, but their humanity as well. 
Across the country, teachers were forced to post outside their classroom doors, in 
arcane code, which among thousands of state standards (e.g., Reading, 
C.4.viii.23) they were meeting at each minute of the school day (Zemelman et 
al., 2005, p. vii-viii). 
 
This major policy shift grounded in the “latest research” resulted in untold harm to the 
education system. Improper policy decisions have ramifications for students’ 
development and education, physiological and psychological welfare, and economic and 
societal outcomes. They also have consequences in the realms of epistemological ethics 
and procedural justice. Falsely inflated degrees of certainty are pretended for the sake of 
political efficiency, and individuals are excluded from the decision making process and 
burdened with disproportionate levels of risk. Examining the sources and nature of 
uncertainty and fallibility lends depth and direction to recommendations regarding 
education policy in America, substantiating a plan for improved policy proposals with a 
more thorough theory of human development and understanding.   
The administrators and political actors responsible for poorly justified policy 
decisions are treated in this essay as well intentioned. “A Critical Thinkers Guide to 
Educational Fads” adeptly characterizes the forces influencing their decisions. The 
authors assert that most administrators lack a substantive conception of education, and 
are often fully occupied with “troubleshooting short-range problems, handling 
complaints, settling disputes, and making sure that legal and bureaucratic requirements 
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are met” (Elder and Paul, 2007). Teachers, likewise, are busy with matters of “day-to-
day survival”: planning lessons, grading assignments, handling disciplinary matters, 
communicating with parents, navigating school politics, implementing new programs, 
and so forth. Although it shapes their daily practice and determines students’ long-term 
success, questions related to philosophy of education appear too abstract and removed 
from their daily operation to merit serious attention. Similarly, activist citizens 
challenge, influence, and redirect school operations, but limited and local interests are 
often their main concern. They typically lack (or think they lack, due to the elevated 
stature of scientific evidence) the background to battle research-based policy proposals.  
It is apparent that a framework for making decisions about the translation of 
new research into policy is necessary for the wellbeing of those affected by it. Attitudes 
of complete skepticism towards scientific progress and uncritical embrace of each latest 
finding are both unhelpful. Strategies derived from such ethical approaches as the 
Precautionary and Proactionary Principles, which prioritize caution and courage, 
respectively, in situations of uncertainty, can be useful to an extent, but are not specific 
enough to the educational context to provide more than general guidance. Because it 
impacts a natural relationship dating back to the dawn of parent-child interaction, 
education reform ought to respect certain boundaries and values that technological 
advances, for example, need not. 
The guidelines proposed will themselves necessarily be characterized by the 
properties of fallibilism. This means they will be incomplete, open to error, and subject 
to modification. In the spirit of Baconian inquiry, however, we must continue to “champ 
 5 
 
at the bit” in pursuit of greater degrees of certainty regarding the principles that ought to 
regulate the policies to which we daily subject millions of vulnerable students. 
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2. THE SOURCES AND NATURE OF FALLIBILISM 
 
While conspicuously absent from education policy decisions, fallibilism is the 
received view in philosophy of science and epistemology. Baron Reed writes in “How to 
Think About Fallibilism” that “[a]lmost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a 
version of fallibilism” (2002, p. 143). Philosophers of science define fallibilism as the 
notion that none of our beliefs is free from the possibility of error, as demonstrated, for 
example, by the continuous revision and evolution of scientific theories.  
There are as many ways of being wrong as there are types of knowledge and 
inquiry. Historical study can go astray, to name a few ways, by neglecting sources, 
relying on inaccurate sources, interpolating patterns, misinterpreting motives, fabricating 
events, ignoring groups of people, or allowing the influence of biases – through 
ignorance or ill-intent. Philosophical inquiry can lead to inaccurate conclusions through 
errors in logic, deductions, and assumptions; misinterpreting texts; twisting language; 
relying on incomplete information; and so forth. Scientific research meets imperfection 
through flawed methods, personal biases and social influences, inaccurate statistical 
analysis, confounding of correlation with causation, and many more inlets. Even barring 
all error or malpractice on the part of the investigator, scientific inquiry only yields 
partial evidence, which could result in faulty conclusions. Mistakes in this field are so 
common that one analyst now posits that “most claimed research findings are false” 
(Ioannidis, 2005, p. 696).  
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Ronald Swartz gives a concise statement of the features of fallibility that are 
particularly relevant to this inquiry:  
The history of fallibilism is an account of the growing awareness that human 
beings, despite the fact that they can at times invent ingenious ideas, can never be 
perfect or know that what they believe is absolutely true…what separates 
fallibilists from those with other views on the nature of knowledge and the nature 
of man is that they are willing to admit that human understanding is limited and 
imperfect. For fallibilists, the knowledge or beliefs of any given period may well 
be superseded by new and better ideas at a later time (1980, p. XVIII). 
Several varieties of fallibilism exist, among them strong and weak fallibilism (Kekes, 
1972, p. 301). My focus in this essay is the fallibility of scientific knowledge, which 
finds its origins in the nature of scientific inquiry.  
 
2.1 Methodological sources of scientific fallibility 
Because it is grounded in an inductive method, natural science only ever 
approximates truth. In contrast to that of a deductive proof, the conclusion of an 
inductive proof is merely probable; it is not guaranteed to follow from the stated 
premises, as is the conclusion in a sound deduction. Rather, the accumulation of 
evidence provides progressive support for the conclusion, while leaving it vulnerable to 
the destructive influence of counterexamples. Einstein once wrote that no quantity of 
evidence could confirm his theories beyond doubt, while a single counterexample could 
disprove them (Silk, 1981, p. 293). Further complicating the matter is the issue of 
determining what constitutes a true counterexample and what is merely an apparent one, 
subject as counterexamples are to the constraints of fallibilism. So it goes for all 
scientific knowledge.  
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The related fact that science progresses through the amendment of theories lends 
further depth to the notion of scientific fallibilism. We ought to expect the continual 
revision and overturn of scientific claims with improvements in method and the 
collection of new evidence. Sometimes this means theories are tweaked to incorporate 
new data; other times theories are entirely rejected as dead ends. A robust understanding 
of fallibilism makes particularly absurd, then, the unilateral implementation of “theories 
of best practice” on only the grounds that they represent “the latest science.” Likewise, 
rhetoric along the lines of “science tells us,” used by such institutions as Harvard’s 
Center on the Developing Child, is misleading and dangerous (Harvard, 2016). Science 
doesn’t tell us anything, much less anything definitive; scientists theorize based on 
available evidence.  
Foundationalism, a main epistemic competitor of fallibilism that grounds beliefs 
in certain knowledge (Poston, 2015), meets difficulties with five aspects of science in 
addition to those described above: the relativity of rational judgments, the social nature 
of science, the necessity of ancillary assumptions, the underdetermination of explanation 
by evidence, and the theory-laden nature of observation (Burbules, 2000, p. 14). 
Premises that seem self-evident to one are judged inadequate and rejected by another. 
Philosophers and scientists alike increasingly recognize the communal influences on the 
practice of science (p. 24). The examination of any particular scientific question depends 
on taking for granted a network of other beliefs and assumptions, using as tools or 
cornerstones in the investigation of one question what may turn out to be inaccurate 
responses to other open questions. A related problem is that a potentially infinite number 
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of explanations fits any given data set (p. 17). Finally, any given observation is colored 
by the observing individual’s prior knowledge and preconceptions, mode of observation, 
and assumptions; it is never “neutral” (p. 15). These obstacles to certainty about 
scientific claims defeat attempts to ground decisions in indisputable empirical evidence.   
 
2.1.1 Implications for translation of research into practice 
Because scientific findings do admit degrees of certainty, one might be tempted 
to determine an acceptable level of risk in new policy implementation by analyzing 
studies’ design, quality, margins of error, reproducibility, and other such factors. A 
leading provider of this sort of information is the Institute of Education Sciences 
(Institute, 2015). This federally funded organization has reviewed nearly 11,000 studies 
to date, with the goal of informing the education decision making of researchers, 
teachers, and policy makers (What, 2015). There are a number of problems with this 
approach. Firstly, meta-studies are also fallible. Secondly, they are constrained by the 
same neglect of variables and values as other scientific studies. Finally, there is arguably 
no acceptable level of risk when it comes to human welfare. Young students especially 
put their current, and to an extent future, wellbeing in the hands of educational 
authorities. Quantifying their welfare and deciding their fate through a cost-benefit 
analysis is inhumane and inappropriate given the gravity of the task. Putting a number on 
the tolerable level of suffering indicates complacency with policies’ harmful effects and 
ingrains this attitude into practice, which may have wider consequences on the 
relationship between the educator and educated. Cost-benefit analyses represent a 
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method fitting for material or mechanical calculations, not those in which the welfare of 
vulnerable, uninformed, and unconsenting individuals is on the line. Checking new 
policy proposals against fundamental principles about the nature of education and the 
human person, on the other hand, would help to keep education reform on track and 
prevent the most egregious violations of this essential human endeavor. As will be 
discussed at length later in the essay, knowledge of these principles is characterized by a 
higher degree of certainty and less risk should elements of them prove incorrect.   
Bacon proposes science as the via media between the “Scylla and Charybdis” of 
certainty and skepticism, but a misunderstanding of its method has led to a new 
instantiation of dogmatism with science as its object. To state it plainly: the very method 
proposed to combat dogmatism has become a source of dogmatic belief. Bacon himself, 
the Father of Empiricism, described the best hoped for outcome of scientific inquiry as 
incremental improvements, or “progressive stages of certainty” (1999, p. 86). When 
public policy reflects ignorance of the limitations of scientific inquiry, it creates a 
mistaken source of authority. Unfortunately a lack of concern for fallibilism runs 
throughout the education system, perhaps compounding its effects as future policy-
makers are educated in reverence for this new idol of the theatre, or mistaken source of 
authority. In “The Role of Philosophy of Science in Science Teacher Education,” 
Michael Bentley and James Garrison describe sampling a number of science textbooks 
designed for use in classrooms. They observe a conspicuous absence of discussion about 
the scientific method and the sort of results it delivers: “[t]he type of reasoning process 
underlying what is described as the scientific method is not discussed...often the 
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textbooks we examined declare that particular scientific formulations ‘have been 
proved’” (1991, p. 69). A science education saturated with such sentiments could easily 
serve to perpetuate the picture of scientific findings as conclusive and indisputable that 
fuels modern policy decisions.  
                       
2.2 Natural foundations of scientific fallibility 
In contrast, some philosophers and scientists suggest that the reason scientific 
theories persistently meet revision is the intractable complexity of the systems they aim 
to describe. This indicates the existence of a deeper source of our fallibilism, particularly 
relevant to complex systems like education, rooted in the nature of the physical world 
and our access to it. As Adam Jaffe explains in “The Science of Science Policy,” 
“Everything is related to everything else, and typically through more than one 
mechanism” (2008, p. 134). Due to the complexity, dynamism, interrelation, and perhaps 
inherent stochasticity of many natural systems, we will always be far removed from 
complete description of them. Daniel Sarewitz suggests in Frontiers of Illusion: Science 
Technology, and the Frontiers of Progress that complex systems may always evade 
effective scientific analysis: "Not only does modern science have no experience of 
success with prediction of highly complex, evolving, interactive systems but new 
scientific theories of complexity suggest that such systems may be inherently 
unpredictable in detail” (1996, p. 86). Stuart Kauffman agrees: “My claim is not simply 
that we lack sufficient knowledge or wisdom to predict the future...It is that these things 
are inherently beyond prediction. Not even the most powerful computer imaginable can 
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make a compact description in advance of the regularities of these processes,” (2008). 
Erwin Schrödinger provides additional support for this notion in Science Theory and 
Man, explaining at length the role of randomness in laws of nature. He describes how 
“chance is the common root of all the rigid conformity to Law that has been observed” 
(1957, p. 136) and the only things observable to us are average values (p. 137).  
An example of the typical evolution of physical theories from determinacy to 
indeterminacy can be seen in the development of the kinetic theory of gasses 
(Schrödinger, 1957, p. 109). A picture of gas molecules as smooth, perfectly elastic 
spheroids was replaced with an undefined system that obeyed a number of mechanical 
laws, which in turn was replaced by a system governed only by the laws of conservation 
of energy and momentum and resulting only in average values (p. 110). 
It used to be the going belief that exact predictions about a physical matter would 
be possible given complete knowledge of initial conditions; in other words, “the system 
under consideration ha[d] to be extended to comprehend the entire universe,” and then 
the mechanisms at play could be traced to an accurate conclusion (Schrödinger, 1957, p. 
53). This would be an enormous task even if the universe were well understood, but it is 
now commonly accepted that upwards of 95% of it is composed of unidentifiable matter 
and energy (Finkbeiner, 2016).  Physicists today claim that even this incredible 
extension would not be enough to ground accurate prediction, due to the indeterminacy 
of the subject matter. So not only is it an issue that “a physical system cannot be 
determined by a finite number of observations [while] in practice a finite number of 
observations is all that we can make” (p. 79), but apparently even an infinite number of 
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observations would not suffice. Swartz explains our resultant state of knowledge in 
Knowledge and Fallibilism as follows:  
Some of our ideas might be partly true, or contain true aspects, but no idea can be 
absolutely true, because we can always conjecture a more informative theory that 
might contain more of the truth. If we accept…that all ideas have an infinite 
number of assumptions associated with them, then no statement of verbal 
account of an idea can contain the complete truth, since it is always possible to 
further explain any theory…there are always some aspects of all ideas which 
must remain unknown. Also, since absolute truth is never attained, human 
understanding can always be improved: what we know at any moment in time 
may eventually be superseded by new and better ideas (1980, p. XXVI). 
 
Because of the infinite assumptions involved in any theory, there is always more that can 
be said to achieve greater clarity, and there will always be aspects of the theory that are 
unexplored. An understanding of scientific knowledge as limited in this way suggests 
that we should use appropriate caution in treating the paradigms it creates as definitive 
pictures of the way things are. Sarewitz critiques the spectacular goals of the National 
Academy of Science, such as “maintaining a leadership position in those technologies 
that promise to have a major and continuing impact on broad areas of industrial and 
economic performance,” as lacking critical engagement with the infinite possibilities for 
interpreting data (emphasis added): 
There is nothing necessarily wrong with any of these goals, just as there was 
nothing wrong with sixteenth-century astronomers adding another epicycle or 
two to better explain the observed position of the planet Mars. But they fail even 
to acknowledge, much less confront, the roots of the intellectual crisis of science 
and technology policy: a paradigm that promotes the creation of discrepancies at 
a far faster rate than our capacity to adjust or respond to them. The way human 
beings – even scientists, and perhaps especially scientists – view the world is 
severely bounded by particular interpretations of reality that Kuhn calls 
paradigms but that, in a different context, could equally well be labeled myths. 
These interpretations are crucial parts of rational inquiry and daily decision 
making; without their constraint, people would be immobilized by an infinity of 
options. Because it is so difficult – impossible, really – for any one person truly 
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to 'see' any more than the tiniest slice of reality, people depend on interpretation, 
paradigms, and mythologies to understand the world…The way that we view the 
world determines the way that we draw our maps; the way we draw our maps 
will determine the paths we can follow in the pursuit of progress (1996, p. 190-
191). 
 
Sarewitz points out that science produces questions at a faster rate than answers, and is 
driven by paradigms that are essentially functional myths. The myths are the best we can 
do as finite, fallible human beings; without them, we would be overwhelmed by infinite 
interpretive possibilities.  One interesting result of our infinitely limited empirical 
knowledge is substantial disagreement about what theories are, how they are confirmed, 
and what their function is (p. 388). “One of the most lively and persistent debates in the 
philosophy of science,” Sarewitz writes, is the one about the status of scientific theories: 
do the entities they employ really exist? Do they offer a true account of the world? Our 
understanding of the subject matter is so constrained that we struggle even to describe 
what science is doing and to distinguish between fictional and actual entities.   
 
2.2.1 Further implications for translation of research into practice 
 Applying knowledge of the limitations of scientific knowledge to its influence on 
education policy, we recognize that a practice predicated on the isolation of particular 
variables and necessary exclusion of infinite systemic relations does not serve to 
construct comprehensive recommendations about a complex, multivariable system not 
subject to the same limitations. Scientific experiments by necessity fracture complete 
systems to evaluate a manageable question and control for a finite number of variables. 
Experiments typically work by attempting to isolate a single effect, and quantitative 
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research in particular is predicated on a view of nature as “regular and predictable” 
(Johnson and Christensen, 2015, p. 34). This excludes subject matter that is dynamic, 
chaotic, situational, social, contextual, personal, or unpredictable.   
Philosophy is not bounded by the same methodological constraints, and as a 
result can deal with education as a unified entity. It provides tools more fit to the task. 
Abstractions and explicit calculations – which get the scientist into trouble when they are 
mistaken for comprehensive descriptions – are not necessarily components of a 
philosophical position. An example from formal epistemology might clarify the issue. 
Epistemologists regularly justify their use of complex mental calculations of probability 
in their descriptive theories of rationality against the criticism that few would have the 
mental acumen to perform such calculations with an analogy to playing catch. While few 
can solve the operations necessary to calculate the ballistics trajectory of a projectile, 
most are able to intuit where to place their arms to complete a soft pass. The complexity 
of the universe is an obstacle to full analysis of it, but not necessarily to operation in it.  
Education is a practice as old and as natural as parenthood. Perhaps science’s 
role should be subordinate to philosophy’s in the realm of education policy, acting as a 
supplement to common sense and moral sense rather than as a dependable dictator. 
Philosophy is better positioned to make systemic recommendations and analyze how 
targeted policy proposals will impact the larger endeavor. It is equipped to satisfy the 
following objectives, outlined in “A Critical Thinkers Guide to Educational Fads” as 
essential components of a substantive education:  
By a substantive concept of education we mean one that highlights the essential 
components of education, consequently one that has clear implications for how 
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we should understand “the educated person” and how we should design the 
educational process. Many popular concepts of education are non-substantive in 
that they are vague and fragmented, and therefore superficial and misleading. 
They do not highlight the common dimensions of the various 
disciplines...Instead, they lead to instruction that mainly trains, indoctrinates, or 
socializes rather than educates the individual. They produce “counterfeits” of 
educated persons because they ignore essential abilities, standards, and traits in 
the instructional process (Elder and Paul, 2007). 
 
                             
 
2.3 Illustrative examples of scientific fallibility 
One group of students particularly vulnerable to the consequences of 
unsubstantiated educational fads is the special education cohort. Consider two examples 
from the history of special education.  
 
2.3.1 Craniosacral therapy 
Craniosacral therapy (CST) – also called craniopathy, neural organizational 
technique, and cranial manipulative therapy (Jacobson et al., 2015, p. 184) – gained 
prominence over the past several decades as a viable treatment for autism and other 
learning disabilities (p. 175). The practice involves mild maneuvering of the cranium in 
an effort to rebalance cerebrospinal fluids (Hartman, 2006). Practitioners were 
convinced the therapy could “improve an astounding range of maladies” and claimed 
“abundant...success with patients.”  CST received governmental recognition, with 
Florida’s legislature passing a bill to make April 2002 “Craniosacral Therapy Awareness 
Month” (Jacobson et al., 2015, p. 177). 
The American Cancer Society, meanwhile, claims that while CST appears to 
alleviate symptoms of stress, there is no evidence that it assists with the treatment of any 
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disease (Russell and Rovere, 2009, p. 187-189). The procedure instead “lacks a 
biologically plausible mechanism, shows no diagnostic reliability, and offers little hope 
that any direct clinical effect will ever be shown” (Hartman, 2006). Despite these 
findings, the method remains popular, resulting in a regrettable waste of time, money, 
and opportunity for genuine intervention. Once understood as an empirically-supported 
best practice, a preponderance of evidence now suggests CST is no more than quackery 
backed by pseudoscience. Its apparent early evidential confirmation has had a far-
reaching impact on the public. Had the layperson understood science through the lens of 
fallibilism rather than trusting fully in the words of apparent experts, the fad would have 
been more readily discarded when evidence mounted to discredit it.  
One might argue that CST was not grounded in science, and its longevity is a 
result of too little faith in science rather than too much. CST had the makings of a 
credible theory, however:  
According to the original model of cranial osteopathy, intrinsic rhythmic 
movements of the human brain cause rhythmic fluctuations of cerebrospinal fluid 
and specific relational changes among dural membranes, cranial bones, and the 
sacrum. Practitioners believe they can palpably modify parameters of this 
mechanism to a patient's health advantage (Hartman, 2006). 
Founding physicians posited initially credible biological mechanisms. The theory was 
also backed by anecdotal evidence, from practitioners and patients in the field, and took 
decades to be labeled as pseudoscience. Whether or not the theory ever resembled a 
proper scientific one, the resulting protracted waste of time and money – measured by 
years of educational time and funding misdirected to finance a fruitless intervention - 
can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the scientific method.  
 18 
 
2.3.2 Reading recovery 
 A second example of an apparently evidence-based theory of best practice that 
was later discredited is “Reading Recovery” (Jacobson et al., 2015, p. 179). Since 1984, 
more than a million students have participated in Reading Recovery, a remedial literacy 
program designed around intensive immersion in reading. Initial studies reported great 
success: the least proficient readers caught up with their peers and maintained the gains 
for three years. Proponents of the method claim that during its 18-year history, over 
eighty percent of participating students reached grade-level proficiency.   
Jacobson et al., however, point out a number of flaws with these studies’ 
methodology (2015, p. 180). In several, only data from those students who successfully 
completed the program were examined, while students who dropped out were omitted 
from the sample. Additionally biasing the sample population, students who had already 
failed the first grade were excluded from the Reading Recovery trial. Competing studies 
indicate a success rate closer to sixty percent, and demonstrate a significant decline in 
proficiency in the months and years following graduation from the program.  
Furthermore, a confounding variable of teacher training was identified. Students 
in the control group were tutored by substitute teachers, while Reading Recovery 
students were instructed by teachers with a minimum of two years of formal training. A 
final problem with the methodology of the studies that reported great success was that all 
students were tested with an instrument designed by the creator of Reading Recovery, on 
information explicitly taught in the program, which means that students participating in 
the program were more familiar with the assessment than the general population.  
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Meta-studies indicate that Reading Recovery is no better than other available 
programs, and may be worse than some (Jacobson et al., 2015, p. 180). Skepticism about 
the program has reached such a level that a group of educational experts has officially 
denounced the practice, going “on record as concluding that the effectiveness of Reading 
Recovery is questionable and it should not be considered a scientifically based treatment 
for reading programs” (p. 180-181). As with CST, one might be tempted to argue that 
this case reveals a need for greater rather than less influence of science on education 
policy. What is at stake is not the involvement of science in policy decisions, however, 
but the degree of faith policy-makers place in a given set of findings. If scientific 
theories are understood to be fallible, continually evolving, and underdetermined by 
evidence, problems similar to the persistence of programs like Reading Recovery (and 
public insistence on its benefits) would be less common. Reading Recovery continued 
for decades and shaped the curriculum of over a million students, despite accumulating 
evidence to the contrary.   
There are a number of ways studies can go awry and evidence can be 
misconstrued. Consulting other fields of expertise earlier in the process could have 
prevented decades of misused dollars and human capital. Consulting the teachers on the 
ground might have revealed hesitations about conflicts of interest imbedded in the study 
and other confounding variables; teachers would be the best positioned to recognize 
differences in results based on levels of attention given to different groups of students 
rather than the brilliance of the program. Teachers perform tiny experiments in their 
classrooms all throughout the day; conscientious teachers are usually well equipped to 
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spot ineffective practices, identify fluctuating variables, appreciate the relational factors 
of pedagogy that cannot be quantified, and adjust their practice accordingly. Educational 
researchers meet problems trying to imitate this process when they impose programs on 
existing ecosystems, blind to the relationships and dynamics already at play. An 
interventionist would not be aware, for example, that Mo has separation issues when it’s 
Dad’s turn to drop him off, that Abby and Lionel cannot be seated next to each other, 
that bubbles help Curly calm down when his temper flares, that Alia regularly confuses 
c’s and o’s, that Larry is acting out because there’s a new baby at home, that April 
always skips the number three when counting, that Adhal is capable of writing his full 
name but will pretend he can’t when asked by strangers, that Bex needs to take a 
bathroom break at noon, and so forth.  
One might argue that new policies need to be tested in the complex ecosystem of 
a classroom one way or another. New policies may offer better ways of doing things, and 
teachers should handle these idiosyncrasies as they arise. My argument is that they 
should be dealt with at the front end of policy proposals rather than treating instances of 
student individuality as anomalies to be managed if and when they arise. Student 
individuality is the rule rather than the exception – it should be built into the philosophy 
of education undergirding policies. Policies cannot effectively be designed for a 
standardized child, and personal uniqueness should not be treated as a distraction, or as 
noise in a study’s evaluation. To take one example, instead of structuring the curriculum 
so that students progress according to the duration of “seat time” spent on various 
subjects, advancement through content could be paced according to individual mastery 
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of objectives. For another example, consider a policy in a preschool classroom that 
tailors behavioral expectations to a plan developed with the help of a student and her 
parents rather than enforcing an inflexible and perhaps culturally insensitive set of rules 
unresponsive to a child’s individual needs and temperament. The outcomes of such an 
individually-tailored policy may be evaluated according to the same metrics as the 
standardized version, using whatever criteria the district deems fit.  
Systems complexity researchers like Kauffman would confirm the colossal 
number and dynamic nature of variables at play in a classroom environment, which adds 
to the difficulties of modeling and offering targeted solutions. The existence of untold, 
ever-shifting factors including nutrition, emotional status, degree of sleep-deprivation, 
parental involvement, stress levels, environmental stimuli, time of day, temperature, 
social pressures, and extracurricular experience make careful study design all the more 
important.   
Those familiar with the fundamentals of developmental literacy could have 
explained problems in Reading Recovery’s methodology stemming from the need for 
basic phonetic competence before reading is possible. Decoding letter-sound 
combinations is a prerequisite for comprehending words, but Reading Recovery asked 
students to run before they could crawl.  
Those versed in the history of education (or any other social practice, for that 
matter) might have cautioned administrators against anything billing itself as a quick fix. 
The track record of silver bullet solutions for social problems is unimpressive at best. 
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While Aristotle did not explicitly theorize about literacy instruction, he explained 
that certain traits could only be developed through instruction, and others only through 
practice. There seems to have been a confusion of these two domains in the Reading 
Recovery program. Instructors attempted to train students through repeated rehearsal 
when explicit instruction was instead necessary. Aristotle also advocated for temperance 
and moderation, naming a number of virtues that need to be developed in concert. 
Focusing on one to the exclusion of others – as was apparently the case with the 
intensive reading immersion that took hours away from other activities each week – can 
have detrimental effects on the character and wellbeing of the student.  
 It is difficult to overestimate the costs of falsely credited theories of best practice. 
At-risk students are deprived of meaningful education, and valuable resources that could 
otherwise be devoted to research or effective practices are wasted (Jacobson et al., 2015, 
p. 177). For the 1999-2000 school year, the federal government spent nearly 50 billion 
dollars on special education services. Studies show limited results with regard to 
academic performance. Again, the argument here is not against scientific input in 
education policy, but against a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific inquiry and 
the strength of the recommendations it is able to offer.  
 One teacher, recognizing the hazardous attraction of innovative policy proposals, 
blogs about the need for education professionals to review them with a skeptical eye. 
“We teachers are just as susceptible to snake-oil sales pitches, fads, and cultural 
pressures as any professionals,” he writes, explaining that they are also subject to the 
“bandwagon effect,” and become “no-holds-barred converts” once select stakeholders 
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lend support (Pennington, 2009). He notes the particular draw of ideas purporting to be 
backed by substantial evidence, observing that “teachers are especially vulnerable to 
new ideas labeled as ‘research-based,’ ‘best practices,’ or ‘standards-based,’” and that 
they “could all do with an occasional reminder that one of our primary duties as teachers 
should be to act as informed ‘crap detectors.’”  
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3. THE UNIQUE CONTEXT OF EDUCATION 
 
3.1 Enduring features of human nature 
In Jonathan Swift’s influential political satire Gulliver’s Travels we find a 
compelling argument for conservatism and against political utopia in light of human 
imperfectability (2003). Through his encounters with various societies that have failed to 
weed out human failings, his inability to conform to the most perfect society of horses, 
and his ultimate loss of natural human features through this final effort, we are made 
aware of non-fictional societies’ persistent historical failure to establish anything 
resembling a utopia. As Swift noted centuries ago, and Aristotle discussed millennia 
before him with his description of the inevitable corruption of any political regime 
(Politics, 1985), there appear to be certain undesirable features of humankind that no 
amount of education or social engineering can eradicate. 
Likewise, it can be argued that individuals possess to a more or less universal 
degree certain admirable features and inclinations that ought to be respected by 
longstanding institutions. Aristotle was among the first to formally distinguished man 
from other types of being, and many philosophies since followed suit. He wrote that we 
have a rational soul, and thus a higher telos than that merited by the vegetative soul of 
plants and the sensitive soul of animals (Ethics, 2009). Certain virtues of thought and 
character are appropriate to a rational soul and necessary for its flourishing; these ought 
to be cultivated through instruction and practice. A more modern formulation of this 
delineation is the capabilities approach outlined by Martha Nussbaum. In response to the 
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question, "What activities characteristically performed by human beings are so central 
that they seem definitive of a life that is truly human?" she lists such capabilities as 
imagination, affiliation, and play (Garrett, 2008). Ancient and modern theories alike 
understand human nature as possessing with some uniformity a number of desirable and 
undesirable features. 
Philosopher David Neil Silk echoes this view of enduring human nature: “Since I 
doubt that people have changed any with respect to the principles of learning since 
Plato’s time, I also doubt that the basic task of inducing learning, that is, teaching, has 
changed very much. For these reasons,” he writes, “we approach new ideas in the 
Philosophy of Education with a healthy skepticism” (1981, p. 291). Given the regularity 
of human nature through the millennia, Silk suggests that radical ideas in education 
reform may not reflect students’ actual interests. Granted there have been enormous 
developments in our tools and in our understanding of the world – consider the 
Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, the development of higher math, and the 
increase in popular literacy. Teachers may now use and teach others to use these 
concepts and tools, but, according to Silk, the basic task of education and the nature of 
learning remain unaffected.   
Aristotle makes a stronger statement about policy innovations. Recognizing 
another durable feature of human nature, he advised politicians against too-frequently 
amending the laws of a nation. Citing the difficulty of promulgating new laws and the 
resultant confusion about the legal status of the actions in question, and stressing 
citizens’ loss of respect for capricious institutions, Aristotle recommended leaving alone 
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well-established rules of conduct (Politics, 1985). While communication over great 
distances is no longer the problem it was in Aristotle’s time, social confusion in the face 
of frequently shifting legal and societal responsibilities is. Unstable policies are a 
breeding ground for miscommunication about and evasion of the law. Similar principles 
to those recommended by Aristotle regarding administrative constancy should be applied 
to education reform. 
 
3.2 Mobilizing enduring features of human nature in education policy 
This is all to say that the role and territory of innovation in education is bounded 
by immutable facts about human nature and the educative process. When explicit 
features about individuals, communities, and the teacher-student relationship in 
particular are recognized, reform no longer appears an open-ended voyage of discovery, 
but its scope and trajectory are instead restricted and directed by definite guideposts. To 
be more specific: there are values such as personhood that reform should not touch, and 
features such as truth-seeking, fallibility, and relatedness that innovation should respect.  
Given that there is a limited role for innovation in education, it remains for us to 
clarify what form and ends it should pursue, and what features it should not interfere 
with. Tradition, folk wisdom, and philosophy offer one ready source of guidance here. 
Investigating what features of education are most fundamental and enduring will help to 
determine what goals education reform should seek to preserve.  
There is a potential problem with deriving guidelines from tradition, folk 
wisdom, and philosophy, however. As discussed, there are several varieties of 
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fallibilism, and some cast so broad a net as to include all sources of human knowledge. 
Peirce simply described fallibilism as the position that “none of our beliefs is immune to 
error” (Weintraub, 1993, p. 251). Even though some of the examples of philosophy or 
folk wisdom considered may turn out to be faulty, the project of checking empirical 
evidence-based policy proposals against these sources of wisdom is a worthy one for 
several reasons.   
First of all, philosophy and folk wisdom have a number of advantages over 
scientific studies relevant to the subject matter of education. They are not limited in 
scope and purpose as science necessarily is by its method – innumerable uncontrolled 
variables and various value claims pose no insurmountable problems for philosophical 
inquiry, which deals readily with complex and dynamic systems, and marks ethics and 
value theory as its proper territory. Folk wisdom can offer viable directives without 
needing to describe all the mechanisms and empirical characteristics involved; as 
explained earlier with the baseball analogy, one can know how to do something without 
knowing how to explicitly describe what that something is.  
Broadly speaking, science is more concerned with descriptive claims and 
extensional knowledge, while philosophy often ventures into the normative and 
intensional realms. A study of emerging literacy, for example, could reveal that a 
particular program moved the majority of students up two levels on the standardized 
evaluation for their age group. It would require philosophical grounding to move from 
this observation to the claim that the program is good for children and should be 
implemented. Further studies could indicate that high levels of literacy are good for 
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certain life outcomes, but not that they are desirable. Philosophy is designed to tackle the 
what’s, why’s, and so what’s of problems like education, while science provides 
empirical support for the how’s. If nothing more, philosophy and folk wisdom serve to 
help set up a system of checks and balances for policy proposals. While new research 
can suggest improvements to educational methods, consulting philosophy of education 
in their implementation ensures the outcomes the methods serve are desirable ones, and 
protects against innovations that violate basic principles about human development and 
relationships.   
Finally, fallible knowledge admits degrees of certainty, and derives strength from 
longevity and consensus. Philosophy of education is at least as old as Socrates, and 
several of its major tenets have remained consistent throughout the history of the field. 
These seem to coalesce around virtue ethics, one of the best established, time-tested, 
cross-referenced theories of human development and flourishing. Though aspects of the 
theory have altered some with time, its foundational principles (e.g. our inclination 
towards flourishing, the set of virtues that assist us on that trajectory, their particularity 
to the type of being we are, and so forth) endure. It is outside the scope of this paper to 
provide a full justification for Aristotle’s philosophy of education, but should one 
strongly object to his system, the framework for decision-making advocated by this 
paper remains a viable one. The principle of subsidiarity discussed in the final chapter in 
fact encourages individual reflection on philosophy of education. The major outcome I 
advocate is that policy decision makers be explicit about the implicit view of human 
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nature contained in their philosophy of education and whether or how this picture is 
represented in the proposals they consider.  
Take, for example, laws restricting the marriage and procreation of individuals 
with disabilities last century. There was widespread belief that parents were the primary 
source of their children’s disabilities, grounded in genealogical analyses, Mendel’s laws 
of heredity, and various sociological studies (Barr, 1913; Turnbull et al., 2011, p. 102). 
This belief encouraged the eugenics movement, which sought to advance the human race 
through selective breeding and elimination of unfit parents. Policies restricting the 
marriages of people with disabilities were established, and over 50,000 individuals were 
sterilized. Reviewing these policy proposals through the lens of virtue ethics would have 
revealed several prohibitive problems. A flourishing society was indeed the end goal, but 
the flourishing of individual citizens, of primary importance for Aristotle, was neglected. 
Individuals in this case were treated as a means to a better society, which is backwards 
from Aristotle’s view of society as a means to better lives for individuals. Issues that 
should have prevented these policies’ implementation include the following: people 
were not viewed in their totality, treated as ends, and understood as individually unique 
with regard to both personal characteristics and pace of development. Their physical, 
social, and moral flourishing was inhibited by policies grossly restrictive of their 
personal decisions. The picture of a human being and ideal education represented in 
these policies is not compatible with virtue ethics, subsidiarity, or fallibilism – two 
additional principles that will be recommended in greater detail below. In brief, the 
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policies did not allow room for later revision, or allow decisions to be made at the lowest 
feasible level.     
 
3.3 Influential philosophies of education 
To flesh out this argument for the use of principles derived from philosophy of 
education to check research-based policy proposals, it is useful to review the major 
tenets of several philosophies of education that are compatible with Aristotle’s. 
Variations on the theme of flourishing and the steps according to which it is pursued can 
be found in a number of educational theories subsequent to Aristotle’s. Consider the 
following models:  
1. Recall that Aristotle thought humans had a telos of eudaimonia, and we reach 
this telos through the development of arete, or virtues. He described two 
types of virtue - virtues of thought, developed through experience, time, and 
instruction, and virtues of character, developed through practice.  
2. Montessori was a constructivist; she emphasized natural development and 
freedom within limits (Crain, 2010). She acknowledged children as 
individuals and tracked development across different domains over time. She 
explained that children develop with guidance and according to internal 
maturational forces, particularly within “sensitive periods,” or spans of time 
in which they are especially inclined to master various tasks. 
3. The key word for Arendt was natality, which indicates the fact that we are 
born into a preexisting world (Arendt, 2006). She thought we ought to protect 
 31 
 
children from the world and the world from children, until children are ready 
to become political adults. The purpose of education is to introduce children 
to world, to help them learn to live in the world. Education protects or 
conserves the new from the old and the old from the new. It requires adults in 
authority, and a strong education in tradition so that students can be or 
contribute something unique.  
4. Kipling's "If" outlines qualities of a virtuous man that mark his completed 
education and development (Kipling, 1943). They primarily deal with 
integrity in social interaction.   
5. C.S. Lewis thought education helped us learn to recognize, and thus love, and 
thus serve the true, good, and beautiful (Lewis, 1974). He also thought we 
needed to learn to grapple with our limitations in doing so.  
6. Gesell argued that nurture and nature both play critical roles in development 
(Crain, 2010). He claimed that many physical traits and skills are heritable 
and develop in a general sequence, but specific milestones vary from child to 
child contingent on genetic mechanisms. His theory lent to recommendations 
of guiding one’s children responsively while respecting their unique and 
natural rates of growth. Development cannot be rushed; best outcomes result 
from monitoring and responding to a child’s internally-regulated schedule. 
7. Rousseau also thought children develop according to nature’s plan (Crain, 
2010). He claimed that they possess innate abilities and are specially in tune 
with sensory experience. His theory led to the belief that constraining a child 
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with too many expectations will make her overly dependent on societal 
approval. Rich experience in natural environments, and focus on self-
mastery, he considered ideal. 
8. Erikson argued that people develop through eight primary stages of life, 
progressing through a sequence of dilemmas from the tension between trust 
and mistrust to the dialectic of integrity and despair (Crain, 2010). As young 
children, students likely face the initiative-versus-guilt conflict, with the 
desired outcome of “purpose.” 
9. Piaget theorized that mental development is actively constructed (Crain, 
2010). He explained that children assimilate new concepts into their cognitive 
maps and make accommodations in these maps when new information does 
not fit. 
10. Chomsky argued that the capacity to learn and use language is a highly 
specialized trait that only humans possess (Crain, 2010). He described how 
children rapidly master complex linguistic rules according to some interior 
scheme. Between three and six, students rapidly develop advanced grammar. 
11. Vygotsky thought that people can only be understood in the context of their 
cultural environment, and that internalizing social interactions develops 
higher mental functions (Crain, 2010). With the help of a more 
knowledgeable other, students can progress within a “zone of proximal 
development.” As a result, guardians and teachers ought to be cognizant of 
students’ current ability levels in order to scaffold developmentally 
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appropriate learning. Adults scaffold instruction by offering greater or lesser 
degrees of support depending on the student’s need. 
12. Bandura wrote about how people learn through imitating observed models 
and mentally coding these social observations, with the result of what 
teachers do being more important than what they say (Crain, 2010). He 
theorized that behaviors like violence, cooperation, gender identity, and self-
efficacy are acquired through reinforcement. A child is always watching, 
learning, and imitating: pro-social behavior and self-esteem can be 
encouraged through modeling and offering opportunities for success. 
13. Kohlberg thought people develop moral reasoning in six stages (Crain, 2010). 
A person progresses from responding to authority and punishment to 
evaluating universal principles, from an inflexible understanding of rules and 
consequences to a more relative consideration of intentions. Progress can 
occur at any age. It is important for educators to understand that a child learns 
moral reasoning neither through direct instruction nor according to an 
internal schedule, but by working through moral dilemmas. Asking students 
to reason through problems and challenging their thinking is the best way to 
develop proficiency in this domain. 
14. Dewey’s philosophy of education was grounded in the pragmatist tradition; 
he prioritized meaningful participation in the democracy of the classroom, for 
the sake of initiating children into the larger democracy of the state. He 
advocated for a curriculum that met students where they were, and he 
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opposed authoritarian methods of instruction. Practical life skills and 
“learning by doing” were key features of his proposed curriculum, and an 
environment infused with “the spirit of art, history, and science” 
characterized the ideal school setting (PBS, 2015). The desired outcome of 
such an education was students “saturated” with a “spirit of service” and 
prepared with effective tools of self-direction to enter and contribute to a 
society “which is worthy, lovely and harmonious.” 
15. Foucault analyzed the power structures inherent in and encouraged by the 
institutionalization of education (Cheshier, 1999). He focused particularly on 
the stigmatization of those who fell outside categories deemed normal by 
institutional forces. Foucault criticized the ways education (among other 
instantiations of power) turned people into subjects, in the sense of things 
subservient to a higher authority.  
16. Martin Buber theorized that an I-thou relationship – characterized by trust, 
wonder, and mutual respect, a communion of two subjects – is necessary 
between beings, while an I-it relationship is appropriate only between a 
person and an object (Buber, 1958). In contrast to an “it,” a “thou” isn’t 
limited by discrete boundaries, but is open-ended. He isn’t to be used or 
merely experienced, but rather entered into relationship with. Meaning and 
identity in life are found through this open-ended relationship. 
 
A recent textbook on best practices in education points to “a strong consensus...about 
how kids learn best. Virtually all the authoritative voices and documents in every 
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teaching field are calling for schools that are more student-centered, active, experiential, 
authentic, democratic, collaborative, rigorous, and challenging” (Zemelman et al., 2005, 
p. vii).  
Closer examination of the theories outlined above reveals substantial 
philosophical consensus on the key issues at stake in education, particularly regarding its 
purpose and its treatment of individual students. What follows is a survey of some 
commonalities important to this project.  
 
3.4 Common threads in philosophies of education 
A majority of the theories emphasize the natural course of development, a 
common trajectory shared by all children in its major points, while individually tailored 
in its details. Both of these elements are critical. On one hand, people follow a 
predetermined progression of maturation, which proceeds according to a natural pattern 
that is relatively standardized. On the other, the milestones and accidental features of this 
progression vary from person to person. The important conclusions from these dual 
aspects of development are recognition of both a common nature and individually 
unique identities. The existence of a common nature allows us to make claims such as 
“all people tend towards flourishing, in regular ways,” and recognition of individuality 
provides for concerns such as those raised by Montessori of not forcing developmental 
milestones and those raised by Foucault about authorities coercing individuals into 
conformity with a standardized model.  
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A related commonality highlighted in a number of the theories of education is the 
necessity of guidance to further this natural course of development. While educational 
and environmental supports are not the sole cause of development, they are needed to 
facilitate certain domains. It is necessary to strike a balance between bestowing guidance 
and allowing space for natural processes to transpire. Vygotsky describes the appropriate 
district of intervention as the “zone of proximal development,” for example, and 
Chomsky emphasizes children’s innate, internal capacities. Our theorists outline another 
dual aspect of education: protecting children from some aspects of life and introducing 
them to others. Arendt focuses on protecting the old from the new and the new from the 
old – preserving the importance of both domains – and thoroughly raising children in 
tradition that they might have the opportunity to contribute something novel; Lewis and 
Kohlberg accentuate the moral dimensions of development in their explanations of the 
need to teach children to love what is good and shun what is wrong.  
In these latter aspects of development, the importance of society and culture in 
general, and adults and guardians in particular, is evident. Arendt, Vygotsky, Bandura, 
Gesell, Aristotle, Kohlberg, and Dewey especially stress the necessity of attentive, 
responsive, and mature educators. Without them, cognitive, physical, emotional, social, 
and moral development alike would be stunted. The end result of education, therefore, 
not only involves some notion of virtuous adulthood, but requires it for the perpetuation 
of the system. This virtuosity spans several domains – Aristotle calls them virtues of 
thought and character; other theorists divide them according to function or related life 
stage. All include at their completion an element of self-direction. 
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The theories surveyed give further instruction about the character of the guidance 
adults are to provide and the appropriate attitude of the teacher towards the student. The 
relational nature of teaching is particularly emphasized in Buber’s philosophy, and 
complements elements of Aristotle’s, Arendt’s, Bandura’s, Foucault’s, Lewis’, 
Montessori’s, and Vygotsky’s. Buber says an “I-thou” relationship is called for between 
human beings. This means the two subjects hold each other in equal esteem, and 
recognize with wonder the open-ended character of the other. In Aristotle’s terms, the 
teacher recognizes the student as an equivalent being, a fellow rational soul. In Arendt’s 
terms, the unique, unpredictable contributions of the next generation should be respected 
and protected, while the students are prepared for a world formed by equally complex 
and valuable adults and traditions. Bandura reiterates that we learn through imitation of 
like beings; Vygotsky spells out the closeness and dynamism of the teaching 
relationship. Montessori respects children’s creative capacity, and preserves the open-
ended nature of their individual inquiry. Lewis honors the spiritual capacity of students 
for boundless pursuit of the true, good, and beautiful through relationship with an 
unbounded other. Foucault reminds readers that students are beings not to be dominated 
or oppressed.  
I have summarized complementarities pertaining to the who, what, when, where, 
how, and why of education, discussing the types of beings involved, the nature and 
situation of the educational task, the steps towards its completion, and its final purpose. 
The uniqueness and “thou”ness of individual students, the need for mature and caring 
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educators, the different domains and stages of development, and the common trajectory 
towards flourishing were covered.  
The great complementarity between these disparate theories of education, and the 
common themes shared among them, indicate strong cohesion in the history and 
philosophy of education regarding the questions of what education is, how it works, 
what its outcomes ought to be, and how the individuals involved should be treated. 
These questions are especially critical to a project aiming to counter-balance the latest 
scientific discoveries with the wisdom of another discipline. To understand what should 
be preserved in education, we need to understand what features are most enduring and 
fundamental to the endeavor.   
I will explore in the final section a system for evaluating education policy 
proposals grounded in a representative theory of education, one of the earliest and most 
fundamental, but also one whose outcomes are implicated in the other theories surveyed.  
There is a considerable degree of correlation between the philosophical 
consensus and traditional “folk wisdom” on this issue. In “A Critical Thinkers Guide to 
Educational Fads,” the authors describe the ideal outcome of education in familiar, 
everyday terms (Elder and Paul, 2007): 
Educated persons share common intellectual standards and abilities. An educated 
person values and seeks to achieve clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, 
breadth, logicalness, and significance in thinking...An educated person 
demonstrates intellectual humility, intellectual honesty, intellectual autonomy, 
intellectual integrity, intellectual perseverance, intellectual empathy, and fair-
mindedness in thought, work, and in every part of life. These characteristics are 
the essential foundations for the right use of the mind. Lacking these 
characteristics, humans think and act egocentrically, do not respect reason and 
evidence (except when it is in their selfish interest to do so), and are indifferent 
to the welfare of others (with whom they do not egocentrically 
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identify)...[Students] come to act more reasonably and effectively in every part of 
life....They use their learning to raise the quality of their lives and the lives of 
others. They become reasonable and fair-minded persons...They are able to use 
their reasoning skills to contribute to their own emotional life and transform their 
desires and motivations accordingly. They come to think, feel, and act effectively 
and with integrity.  
 
You will notice remarkable confluence between the Critical Thinkers’ statement about 
the desired intellectual outcomes of education and the philosophies examined above: the 
authors effectively describe a number of virtues of thought and character. While some 
philosophers of education propose more radical revisions to the education system than 
are admitted by folk wisdom, even these rarely stray too far from the fundamental 
principles mobilized in this project. On the whole, the theories presented offer more 
detailed or systematized constructions of the truths presented in basic folk wisdom. 
Where the two methods offer differing conclusions, both may be used to check and 
balance proposed policy innovations. I will consider in greater detail in the final chapter 
what to do when principles derived from philosophy or folk wisdom apparently 
contradict.   
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4. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS 
 
While existing education practices are not beyond reproach, my focus in this 
paper is the implementation of policies inspired by new research. For the assessment of 
existing practices, a method can be derived from the process explored below. The 
research and motives behind existing practices could be reverse-engineered, and a 
similar method could be employed to check relevant components against time-honored 
principles. This method starts with historical research into why policies were 
implemented, and proceeds to compare the findings with the pertinent philosophical 
positions.  
One might also point out that fallibilism and uncertainty affect every field in 
which new research must be translated into practice. Educational practice is one 
particular case study of a broader phenomenon, and one in which the issues created by 
overconfidence in science would benefit from speedy rectification. Additionally, it might 
be possible to determine more general characteristics of the problem and appropriate 
measures with which to address it upon conclusion of this analysis.   
 
4.1 What to expect from policy reform 
One general principle can be found in the unlikely source of the skeptical 
philosophy of David Hume. Firstly, Hume differentiated between the scientific method, 
which scientists practiced, and the “experimental” method, which he preferred (Letwin, 
1998, p. 84). In following the experimental method, one proceeds by deducing general 
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rules through an analysis of individual occurrences. The scientific method, on the other 
hand, he described as drawing various inferences from a pre-determined abstract 
principle. While more aesthetically appealing, the scientific method he thought less 
suited to “the imperfection of human nature” and named a “common source of illusion 
and mistake.”  
Hume’s skepticism, on the other hand, did not leave him so far from 
approximations of certain truth that he refused any universal pronouncements. In fact, he 
“even [proscribed] general rules, as if for all men and all times” (Letwin, 1998, p. 83). 
He derived these not from empirical evidence, but from the wisdom gained from a 
lifetime of human experience. He thought that attempts to resolve political questions 
with science were perilous, and he drew instead from perceived regularities in men and 
nature (p. 84). It is encouraging to the project of delineating general principles about 
education and human nature due respect by policy innovations that one of the foremost 
skeptics of rational inquiry not only allowed, but relied on similar methods. 
One such rule had to do with a pursuit related to our own, that of establishing or 
maintaining a suitable political order. Hume’s advice: don’t seek a utopia, seek to 
safeguard the existing order from its own frailties (Letwin, p. 89). “Just as in the good 
man the passions are in balance, so in the good government,” Hume argued, “the various 
powers and interests are arranged to prevent any one from becoming excessive.” This 
recommendation about political governance accords remarkably with a fallible view of 
human knowledge and endeavors. The best we can hope for, Hume seems to say, is a 
system that uses its intrinsic features to check and balance one another.  
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Education policy can take a number of forms. Educators and educated are guided 
and constrained by federal policy, state policy, district policy, and school policy, to name 
a few. One significant influence on policy decisions is educational research. In an 
attempt to stay ahead of the curve, in many settings, administrators apply recent findings 
and an accompanying system of accountability to the school system under their charge 
with little apparent critical reflection. From this “pathos for the new” what results might 
be described in Hannah Arendt’s terms as an “astounding hodgepodge of sense and 
nonsense” (Arendt, 2006). 
In “Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental 
Assessment of Decision Models,” researchers at the Institute for Science, Technology 
and Public Policy reach a conclusion about decision making that supports Swift, 
Aristotle, Silk, and Arendt’s cautionary counsel. Their study of simulated high stakes 
military decisions reveals that experienced decision makers possess an “action 
orientation,” preferring to “do something” even when “doing nothing” is objectively the 
most favorable option (Vedlitz et al., 2005, p. 23). The authors conclude that a change in 
protocol might be necessary to encourage optimal decision making given this inclination 
to action: “programs may need to pay more attention to this action orientation and 
minimize the risk of only making action-based choices when sometimes, ‘doing nothing’ 
is actually the best option.” It is feasible that experienced administrators and policy 
makers suffer the same action orientation, preferring to “try something” when faced with 
challenges in a school system, even if the resultant action is less favorable than the status 
quo.  
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Consider a routine example from Head Start classrooms in Clark County, 
Nevada, one of the largest school districts in the nation. In light of current research on 
the negative effects of an overabundance of “direct instruction” – the term for the 
pedagogical style in which a teacher delivers a lesson and students sit and listen – on 
children in early stages of development, teachers were banned from using alphabet 
posters in their rooms “because it’s rote learning and that’s bad.” This well-intentioned 
effort to protect students’ free inquiry in fact misinterpreted recent publications and 
neglected the existence of different types of knowledge and learning, to the detriment of 
the education of an extremely vulnerable population. 
An alternative method of education reform that does not in one fell swoop “thrust 
aside” tradition and “all the rules of sound human reason” (Arendt, 2006) is one that A. 
weighs new policy suggestions against a time-honored set of principles respecting the 
nature of education and B. delegates decision-making to the lowest feasible level. 
 
4.2 Applying principles derived from subsidiarity and fallibilism 
The practice of relegating decisions to the lowest feasible level is time-honored 
principle in certain social institutions. Known as “subsidiarity” in the Roman Catholic 
tradition, for example, the practice was prescribed by Pope Pius X in the encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno:  
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil 
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For 
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every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the 
members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them (1931). 
Subsidiarity is valuable in general for its tendency to preserve integrity, function, and 
autonomy at various levels of natural hierarchies: it frees higher levels of organization 
for decision-making that can only occur there, and preserves lower levels from 
subsumption and therefore destruction. The principle is particularly valuable in contexts 
of uncertainty, where there is legitimate disagreement about the most beneficial course 
of action.  Allowing a potential plurality of decisions not only fosters a number of 
“experiments,” the outcomes of which can then be compared, but it exonerates one 
overarching authority from coercing disagreeing parties into questionable practices.  
 It is well-acknowledged that certain questions, often those of purpose and value, 
lie outside the domain of scientific inquiry. Sarewitz points to a few in Frontiers of 
Illusion:  
What types of scientific knowledge should society choose to pursue? How should 
such choices be made and by whom? How should society apply this knowledge, 
once gained? How can 'progress' in science and technology be defined and 
measured in the context of broader social and political goals? (1996, p. ix) 
In other words, science has a cultural pedigree and social posterity; its process results 
from and is productive of information and values that must be analyzed with non-
scientific tools. Sarewitz continues to explain that the most important factors in policy 
debates do not stem from scientific data, but from a source closer to the average citizen, 
the “matrix of cultural values that guides society in its struggle to advance” (p. 95). It is 
critical to distinguish the role of this matrix of values from the role of science. Expertise 
in the mechanics of embryonic stem cells, for example, does not directly translate to 
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greater moral capacity to judge the ethicality of their use in research; facts about stem 
cells can inform ethical judgements about their use, but not make them. The costs of 
relinquishing one’s status as an ethically relevant citizen are estimated by some to be 
severe. Robin George Collingwood theorizes that “reliance on rules and theories derived 
from natural science, divorced from the context in which they were to be applied, is what 
bankrupted modernism” (Baggini and Stangroom, 2005). Collingwood refers here to the 
devolution of a modernism that rejected tradition into a postmodernism characterized by 
unresolve. Because the scientific information provided by experts is a. fallible and b. 
limited in scope, the general public cannot and should not defer to them in all matters of 
decision-making. Principles derived from folk wisdom, philosophy of education, 
fallibilism, and subsidiarity are helpful here.  
The principles for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty depend on 
the nature of the decisions being made. They will look different in an educational 
context, for example, than in a laboratory setting. In education policy decisions, these 
principles should center on a robust notion of human nature, as the primary material 
involved and affected.  
From the concept of fallibilism itself we can deduce a number of features about 
people: we are finite, often mistaken or uncertain, and more complicated than we can 
understand, since knowledge about ourselves as part of the material universe is also 
subject to the constraints of fallibilism. We are also capable of pursuing truth and 
attaining greater degrees of certainty, and are perhaps fundamentally inclined to do so.  
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A framework for decision making that gives due respect to these characteristics 
would value the autonomy, complexity, fragility, and intrinsic drives of individual 
agents. In practice, this framework might translate to such a principle as "avoid 
'innovative' policies that present a one-dimensional picture of the student and what is 
good for her" or "pursue innovation that enhances students' abilities to seek greater 
certainty." 
 
4.3 Applying principles derived from virtue ethics 
Further guidelines for evaluating new policies could be derived from Aristotle’s 
analysis of human nature and subsequent additions to his analysis by Thomas Aquinas 
and Martha Nussbaum among others. Aristotle situated humankind at the top of a 
hierarchy of beings, as possessing souls with nutritive, sensitive, and rational capacities 
(Ethics, 2009). Whereas plants achieve flourishing though nutrition and physical 
development, and animals, through the additional exercise of basic desires and 
locomotive powers, man is further inclined towards knowledge and understanding.   
Taking the purpose of education to include developing the groundwork for 
human flourishing, education policy should work in conjunction with and not against the 
framework that enables flourishing. If Aristotle’s framework is taken as a reasonable 
one, this means virtues of thought and character should be fostered, and vices 
discouraged. Virtues of thought – which he says are developed through instruction, 
experience, and time – include virtues having to do with reasoning, like wisdom, 
comprehension, and intelligence (Ethics, 2009). Virtues of character – which he explains 
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are developed through practice – include such traits as justice, temperance, and fortitude. 
Further conditions that qualify these characteristics as virtuous include intentionality, 
awareness, and delight. Maximum virtuosity is achieved when one knowingly and 
cheerfully pursues desirable character. Parochial schools might consider Thomas 
Aquinas’ amendment of faith, hope, and charity, three theological virtues without which 
he thought a definition of human flourishing was incomplete.  
Given this set of criteria for what characteristics allow for human flourishing, it 
remains to translate them into a strategy for decision making. A simple rule of thumb 
would be to encourage policy revisions that promote or at least make space for the 
development of virtues of thought and character. Favorable educational policy would 
lend to the instruction and habituation of virtues. Such policy could manifest in a variety 
of forms, including pedagogy, curriculum, assessment, and institutional organization.  
Consider the following examples. Teacher training programs that emphasize 
modeling of and reinforcing examples of virtues would be fostering a desirable 
pedagogical style. This could look like a teacher verbalizing her thinking process and 
indicating the tools used to reach her final judgment when faced with a complex 
question from a student, and praising evidence of the same in her students, thus 
modeling and incentivizing virtues of thought.  
Curricula that provide explicit instruction regarding and opportunities for 
practicing virtues of thought and character would likewise fit the mold of an education 
conducive to flourishing. School policy aimed to promote the full development of the 
humans in its charge would incorporate the virtues in its standards and lessons. The 
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virtue of ‘courage,’ for example, which is developed through practice since it is a virtue 
of character, could be built into lesson plans requiring students to defend an unpopular 
stance to their peers.  
District policy allowing the administration of meaningful assessments that both 
evaluate virtuous behavior and encourage it through their completion would be another 
example of beneficial regulation. Innovative programs like Kentucky’s Danville 
Independent Schools have developed assessments that require virtue in their preparation 
and execution. Students at these schools maintain portfolios of their best work and 
perform regular “presentations of learning” for the community (2016). In contrast to 
standardized state tests, completed in isolation in a stressed expenditure of energy and 
then forgotten, these assessments require the enduring engagement of the whole person. 
Rather than hunching over a desk filling in bubbles - which admittedly requires the 
limited exercise of some virtues of character and thought as students refrain from 
cheating and apply their learning - students are participating naturally as citizens in a 
society, developing thoughtful answers to questions posed by interested community 
members. Assessment can function in this way as a continuation of learning rather than 
mere evaluation of it. 
Finally, an example of institutional organization that promotes the development 
of virtue would be one that respects all stakeholders as rational beings and acknowledges 
students’ capacities and limitations through its structuring of space, time, and 
communication.      
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Unfavorable policy, on the other hand, would exclude the development of virtue 
either through neglect or active encouragement of vice. This could happen in many 
ways. Through excessive focus on one virtue or one aspect of a virtue, other qualities 
necessary for flourishing could be ignored. Such results are evident in high performing 
students who lack integrity, technically skilled students without fortitude, or charitable 
and just students without the intellectual tools to evaluate their good intentions. A recent 
high profile example of the consequences of this type of unbalanced education can be 
seen in the longitudinal results of the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP, 2016). KIPP 
graduated at-risk students from high school at unprecedented rates, only to have a 
staggering number (67%) drop out of the post-secondary programs to which they were 
admitted (Tough, 2011). Program evaluators concluded that an absence of emphasis on 
certain key character traits, specifically “grit” or resilience, contributed to the trend. 
Unreflectiveness about the type of beings we are and the purpose of education make 
missteps like these easy traps to fall into.  
As with the examples of craniosacral therapy and Reading Recovery, it may 
initially appear that empirical evaluation discovered and solved its own problems in the 
case of KIPP. The improvements made in later theories of best practice over previous 
ones were suggested by new and better studies. If it is the case that science is the best 
tool for finding and correcting its errors, why not advise more rather than less reliance 
on scientific studies? As explained in the craniosacral therapy and Reading Recovery 
examples, it was inordinate trust in scientific evidence that created the problems to begin 
with. While later studies eventually served as correctives to previous errors, reference to 
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guidelines derived from philosophical principles could have mitigated the harm caused 
in the interim. Furthermore, consultation with other sources of knowledge could have 
identified a number of the issues in question before the policy was even implemented. 
Finally, it remains the case that scientific findings will always be characterized by a 
degree of uncertainty, and reference to a solid philosophy of education would provide a 
worthy check to questionable policy implementation.  
A more modern formulation of Aristotle’s virtue ethics is found in Amartya 
Sen’s capabilities approach, which was further developed by Martha Nussbaum (Wells, 
2015). Some of the fundamental capabilities Nussbaum highlights include life, health, 
choice, thought, emotion, imagination, reason, affiliation, and play (Garrett, 2008). 
Similar to the translational framework described above, policy in line with this 
understanding of human nature would honor and promote the exercise of the capacities 
understood as being part of what make us human. Policy that in some way systematically 
or significantly denies or inhibits the exercise of these capacities would not pass the 
capabilities test. 
 
4.4 A defense of philosophy as a valuable tool in education policy decisions 
Policy revisions proposed in the name of science, then, could be checked against 
a matrix of virtues and capabilities to ameliorate the potential consequences of fallible 
results. Applying a time-tested, philosophically-grounded redundancy provides 
insurance against overconfidence in the scientific method.  
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Furthermore, philosophical evaluation may prove a more fitting tool for subject 
matter with agency and personhood. The method of hypothesis, experiment, and 
evaluation is fine for inanimate or low-stakes material, but a certain modicum of dignity 
is appropriate for human subjects. Because the subject matter of the inquiry is equal in 
autonomy, dignity, and complexity to the inquirers, it is not suitable for the inquirers to 
reduce the subjects to mere objects for experiment. At minimum, educational 
experiments should be backed by a theory with a high degree of certainty, developed in 
respect to enduring features of human nature, and the subjects ought to be made aware of 
the experiments in which they are participating. It is a well-recognized feature of human 
subjects research that the individuals involved should be informed and consenting 
whenever possible. The philosophical framework recommended as a supplement to 
educational research does not attempt to map every empirical datum relevant to 
education, but aims towards a noble end while acknowledging the inescapable 
complexity and indeterminacy present in human affairs. The framework described in this 
chapter refrains from treating the people involved in the education system as mere 
subjects of research or composites of observable behavior, respecting them instead as 
dynamic and teleological beings.  
The Harvard Center on the Developing Child has the professed goal of driving 
“science-based innovation that achieves breakthrough outcomes for children facing 
adversity” (Harvard, 2016). Their theory of change involves fast-paced experimentation, 
or “the rapid design and testing of new intervention strategies grounded in the science of 
early childhood.” Rapid change sounds desirable when conditions are unfavorable, but 
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change implies progress, and this is not guaranteed by the scientific method. Harvard 
researchers acknowledge the hazards involved in their method: “For us, innovation 
means taking risks…and learning quickly from ideas that don’t work.” Here again, risk-
taking is not necessarily ignoble, if those bearing the brunt of the risks a. consent to 
them, and b. reap the major benefits. In the case of the Center on the Developing Child, 
it would appear that the most significant costs are born by the children of failed 
experiments, whose situations have little room for further stressors. While it may be 
argued that the costs borne by children deprived of the benefit of successful 
experimentation are also significant, these costs represent the failure of a positive rather 
than a negative responsibility of researchers – the aspirational responsibility to help, 
instead of the definite responsibility to refrain from harming – which many see as a 
supererogatory rather than an obligatory responsibility. We cannot hold researchers 
accountable for failure to improve every aspect of school for every student across all 
nations and for the duration of mankind; they are constrained by limited time and 
resources. Their position of power over those in the education system, however, requires 
them to employ what resources they do command with the greatest respect for those they 
intend to serve.  
Additional problems with standard means of program evaluation arise from the 
complexities of human nature. Self-reports are notoriously unreliable and fraught with 
perverse incentives, and data collection by a third party is riddled with issues stemming 
from the observer effect. Any teacher will tell you that how his classroom behaves in 
front of onlookers bears little relation to its habitual operation. This becomes a serious 
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problem when one is seeking to measure the typical and enduring impact of a program 
change. The difficulties of quantifying or measuring the most important aspects of 
education aside, the mere presence of an assessment or assessing figure significantly 
alters the function of the observed individuals.   
For an extreme example of this issue, consider the regular safety and 
performance inspections to which the federally funded Head Start program is subject. 
Typically a several minute warning precedes the commencement of a formal inspection 
in Clark County. Phone calls are traded between school sites to warn of an impending 
visit by a person of authority, and staff snap into shape, rushing around to meet 
compliance with whatever measures is of interest on a given day. In an organization 
governed by an impossible number of (occasionally conflicting) rules, and in which 
termination is threatened weekly and “100% compliance, no excuses” is the unofficial 
motto, the staff’s frantic response is understandable. The resultant measures of success 
are, however, completely inauthentic.  
A frontloaded philosophy of education, in contrast, that aims towards virtue and 
capability development from its genesis, respects the humanity of those involved, 
preserves them from haphazard experiment, acknowledges fallibilism and the related 
difficulties of objective description and measurement of complex systems, and inclines 
towards local decision-making (while still granting appropriate oversight), provides a 
worthy check against this sort of nonsense. As discussed at length above, there are 
questions that lie outside the purview of science, and in consequence require other 
means of resolution. Sarewitz explains one aspect of this issue in Frontiers of Illusion, 
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writing, “When scientists ridicule public opinion [that differs from their own about 
matters loosely related to their area of expertise], they implicitly argue that wise 
decisions about the potential societal impacts of research can only be made by experts” 
(1996, p. 65).  He explains that in actuality, “of primary importance are the underlying 
social and moral dilemmas that drive public concern.” Not only are there a great number 
of value-laden decisions unreachable through the scientific method, but scientists 
additionally acknowledge that certain branches of inquiry do not admit of predictive 
theories. There are questions of value that science is not fit to answer, and there are 
questions of fact that science is unable to answer. Sarewitz highlights the hypocrisy of 
those encouraging a scientific answer for every question while maintaining the 
indeterminacy of the scientific method. He explains, furthermore, that whether or not our 
societal questions are too complex for science to resolve, “non-experts” deserve and 
ought to be given a voice. Sarewitz’s neat complaint against scientism segues nicely into 
a summary of the key principles that should be used to check science-based policy 
proposals. 
 In the proposed remedy to unquestioning translation of the latest research into 
educational practice, principles derived from fallibilism, subsidiarity, and virtue ethics 
serve as a counter-balance to empirical findings. Historically well-established ideas 
about the nature of education and the beings involved offer one reasonable check against 
over-hasty implementation of new research. Should the proposed policies violate any 
closely held truths about the task of education and what treatment is appropriate for 
human beings, administrators should seek another solution. While the principles 
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highlighted offer a viable and comprehensive framework for evaluating policy proposals, 
there is some reasonable disagreement about the details of what makes for an ideal 
education. Thus, the principle of subsidiarity may come into play to a greater or lesser 
degree in different contexts as those involved in the educative process examine and 
compare ideas about what guidelines are conducive to human flourishing.  
 Scientific research, on the other hand, serves to challenge and refine theoretical 
notions about human nature and development. It may be the case that well-supported 
findings in, say, neuroscience, help tailor practitioners’ understanding of what it means 
for a person to live a good life, and how to provide the best supports for growth in that 
direction. In this way scientific inquiry can serve as a corrective to philosophical 
arguments, and the two disciplines of science and philosophy check and balance each 
other. Philosophy should remain the primary evaluator of policy proposals, however, as 
a method better suited to the subject matter, as discussed above. While we ought to 
expect revision to scientific theories, it would be highly surprising if our entire 
conception of human fallibility and flourishing proved without merit.  
 One objection that might arise to this proposal is that checking new policies 
against principles derived from virtue ethics, fallibilism, and subsidiarity requires the 
accurate prediction of empirical consequences, which is the very undertaking called into 
question by fallibilism. Every policy proposal may very well entail unknown, 
unforeseen, and unrecognized outcomes; it could turn out to be quite difficult to predict 
the ways in which all the consequences promote or inhibit virtue. Policy A may have 
negative outcomes that are not identified or identifiable until twenty years into 
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implementation; Policy B could have ambiguous results that current technology, metrics, 
and theories cannot capture. Advising policy makers to screen new proposals according 
to philosophical principles – eliminating proposals that run against a shared 
understanding of education and the human person – ignores their potential inability to 
project in detail how a given policy will influence a school’s ecosystem.  
 Since this objection can also be raised against the current method of basing 
decisions on the best science available, it is not a particularly effective one. Research or 
evidence-based policy also relies on current tools, predictions, and best estimates, so the 
new method should at least not fare any worse. What the philosophical counter-balance 
offers that the current system does not is an evaluative tool not solely dependent on 
empirical evidence, but additionally supplemented by traditional wisdom and value-
enriched reasoning. While one could critique both the scientific and philosophical 
methods for their dependence on induction-based predictions, the latter method removes 
policy decisions from a realm strictly limited by statistical analyses of data points. 
Instead, the philosophical principles applied contribute to a more robust 
educational theory against which the evidence can be checked, which would facilitate 
policy makers’ evaluation of the picture of the human person and educational process 
represented in the policy proposal. When looking at the policy itself, interested parties 
could determine from its justification, proposed method, and aims whether or not a 
desirable view of human nature is presumed. A policy justified by its enhancement of 
administrative efficiency, enacted by doubling standardized testing requirements, and 
aimed at improving a district’s ranking, for example, would deserve further attention as 
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misunderstanding the purpose of education and what is good for the beings involved. A 
policy aimed at enhancing the reading abilities of toddlers through replacing classroom 
teachers with individualized literacy software programs justified by reference to the 
program’s success with adult learners should likewise be revised as misunderstanding 
developmental stages and the relational nature of people. At the level of the theory 
underlying the policy, the fleshed out theoretical framework provided by the 
philosophical principles recommended would enable policy makers to determine 
whether the theory’s auxiliary assumptions reflect a view of human nature compatible 
with virtue ethics. If the theory applied treats education as the open-ended molding of a 
formless lump of clay, for example, informed policy makers would question the 
resulting policy as lacking in understanding of the common trajectory and pre-existing 
tendencies of human beings. Finally, when theories are underdetermined by evidence, 
virtue ethics can help guide interpretation and implementation. If one of the ways a 
series of studies’ results can be interpreted suggests that focusing on one aspect of 
temperament leads to greatest educational gains, and another that only short term gains 
are in fact evidenced while a more holistic approach to character yields more desirable 
results, virtue ethics would recommend the latter.  
 On a related note, one might object that the traits described in this set of 
recommendations as the most important outcomes of the educational process are ones 
that are not easy to assess – for example, wisdom and charity. These are internal, 
dispositional, enduring qualities, not discoverable by standardized tests, difficult to 
observe, and possible to feign. This objection could be interpreted as an argument for 
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rather than a criticism of the proposed method, however. Policy decisions must be 
frontloaded with a robust and reliable philosophy of education, given the limitations on 
back-end assessment and program evaluation. Because educators cannot count on 
classroom data to reveal students’ character and dispositions, they must institute policies 
established through other means – tradition, folk wisdom, personal experience, 
philosophical evaluation – to be favorable to the development of virtue.  
 Finally, it might be objected that these recommendations are too general to 
provide real guidance: policies may significantly promote some virtues while slightly 
inhibiting others, could respect human fallibility but ignore the recommendations of 
subsidiarity, might foster the orientation to flourishing of students while inhibiting that 
of the teacher, or any other iteration of grey area solutions. It is not clear if compromises 
are acceptable, and if so, in what scenarios. A matrix for decision-making specific 
enough that the recommendations do not conflict, but general enough to avoid 
resemblance with the American tax code would be desirable. A framework too general 
could result in inaction or perceived permission for action according to subjective 
whims; a framework covering every possible circumstance would be impossible to 
construct and too cumbersome to regularly consult.  
 Like virtue ethics itself, however, one of the virtues of this solution is its 
moderate flexibility. Aristotle’s ideal man is equipped with training in a certain set of 
principles that prepare him to exercise virtue in an infinity of possible scenarios. He is 
not equipped with a categorical imperative fit for every occasion; he is guided uniquely 
in each situation by a lifetime of carefully constructed habits and intellectual virtues. 
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Because it is impossible to prescribe a rule for every potential situation, a framework 
prioritizing certain values essential to the educational process is outlined, and it is left to 
the discretion of those at the most appropriate level of decision-making of how to 
interpret them. Granted, the flexibility of the model leaves it open for potential abuse by 
ineffective teachers and administrators, but this flaw mars every system, even those with 
an extreme degree of oversight, as discussed with the Head Start examples. The method 
proposed is not fool-proof, but it is an improvement over the current process in a number 
of ways. The purpose of education is recognized, the humanity and autonomy of local 
actors is restored, the potential for future revision is respected, and the nature of 
developing humans is appreciated. Autarchic reliance on unstable scientific findings is 
replaced with a more varied toolkit, and the resulting system of checks and balances is 
designed to enhance future education policy decision making.   
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